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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
C. R. OWENS TRUCKING COR-

PORATION,
Plaintiff and Appelant
vs.

HAROLD STEWART,

CASE
No.

12988

Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF RIDSPONDENT
srrATEM:ENT OF FACTS
The entire v:oir dire of the jury panel (Tr. 2 through
29) contains essential facts for proper consideration of
this appeal.
The entire "insurance" incident, as reflected in the
transcript (Tr. 30 - 31) is important, and for convenience
we quote the transcrip as follows:
"A Yes. Well, we had to bring another truck
down and we thought maybe we'd switch the

load but then v,-e decided that the frame w
bent. We never did get it back together aga
when it came apart, we had experience with tb
before so we decided we'd have to get it back 1
on its own power, so we put new bearings in
then we to ok it up to our shop in Roy and wa.
ed. I talked to Mr. Stewart's insurance man ai
he indicated that he was going to take care 1
it at the time and1

THE COURT: Just a moment.
MR. ALSUP: Your Honor, I am sorry
THE, COURT: Let me say this to yo
Mr. Owens, just answer the questions that a1
asked of you, don't volunteer.

THE WITNE'8S: All right.
MR. ALSUP : There is no insurance ir
volved in this case, your Honor, may we mak
that clear?

THE COURT: Well, let me say this ti
you, members of the jury, you have two state
ments regarding insurance, you are to disre
gard both of them. Whether or not there is an
insurance in this lawsuit or any lawsuit is o
no materiality to the jury, disregard it and yo1
are so instructed. Now you may proceed."

The defendant's insurance policy did not exceed thE
prayer of the complaint, but this isn't important. vVha
is important is that he did in fact have insurance.
2

\Vith these additions, we accept plaintiff's statement
of facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING ON MOTIONS RAISED BY THE "INSURANCE".
STATEMENT
We are not certain just what relief plaintiff requested of the trial Judge. We don't see any motion from the
plaintiff in the transcript. Nonetheless, we assume that
plaintiff intended to move the Court for a mistrial, based
upon the statement made by defendant's attorney concerning insurance. This assumption is based upon the
proceedings taken before the Oourt in the absence of the
jury, and reported at page 2, 3 and 4 of the seeond reporter's transcript, dated January 23, 1973. At this hearing the Court tO'ok the question raised by plaintiff under
advisement and invited plaintiff to submit authority.
None was submitted. The judgment on the verdict was
permitted to stand, and so we assume that we deal here
with a motion for mistrial by plaintiff and a denial thereof by the Court and an assignment of error thereon by
the plaintiff.
The undersigned, who was defendant's counsel and
who made the questiioned statement eoncerning insurance, does not seek to justify that statement. Admittedly, the statement as eontained in the transcript i~ not
what I thought I said, and certainly not what I intended
saying; but obviously it is what I did s·ay. The error,
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from the lawyer's standpoint, is not just what 'vas said,
but rather, it is that anything at all was said, other than
asking the Court to a<lmonish the jury to disregard the
inference 'Of insurance created by plaintiff's statement.
Therefore, any attempt to justify the statement would
merely compound the blunder.
The important question on this appeal, however, i1i
whether or not the Court committed error in its handling
·of the problem created. What the Court did is reported
at page 31 of the transcript, and we quote:
"THE COURT: Well, let me say this to you,
members of the jury, you have two statemenh
regarding insurance, you are to disregard both
of them. Whether or not there is any insurance in this lawsuit or any lawsuit is of no materiality to the jury, disregard it and you are
so instructed. Now you may proceed."
Without justifying any statement made by or on behalf of either party, and without quarrelling with any
·of the authorities cited by plaintiff in his Brief, we submit that the jury, if at all interested in the question,
would be just as inclined, or more inclined, to conclude
from the statement and the counter-statement that there
was insurance, rather than that there was no insurance;
and in any event the Court properly handled the matter
with its cautionary admonition.
In urging that there was no reversible error inV'Olve4
in the incident, we do not ask the Court to endorse the defendant's method of handling the insurance problem as
a model. We only say that in this particular case, con4

sidering what was said on both sides, and then reviewing the conduct of the trial J u<lge in seeking a f.air trial,
there was no reversible error.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOr:L1 ION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE.
Prior to the trial, plaintiff moved for a change of
venue on the ground that a fair trial could not be had
in Millard County. He moved the Court for a transfer
to Weber County, where he resides. The substance of
pl•aintiff's complaint was and is that in a rural livestock
area of relatively limited population, a fair jury could
not and cannot be had because most juries have some
acquaintanceship with the defendant, and would, like
defendant, be engaged in some phase of the livestock
1business.
No affidavit was filed with this motion made by the
plaintiff, and no evidence was offered to support it.
Since some factual foundation is required for any
court action, and since none was presented by the plaintiff in support of his motion for change of venue, the
eourt was asked by the plaintiff to say that presumptively the people of Millard County are so prejudiced against
outsiders that a fair trial there is not possible. Reduced
to the facts .of this case, the court was asked by plaintiff
to say: In a case involving damage allegedly caused by
a cow on the highway and defective fencing, the people
of Millard County, Utah being livestock people predominantly and having some acquaintanceship with defendant
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by reason of the limited population in the area, are p
judiced in favor of the defendant. Therefore, a fair ti
by a jury in Millard County is impossible.
This is an awful indictment against not only a co
munity of people, but also against our jury system. '1
integrity of our jury system is just not that tenuo
Nothing in our years of working under that systemin our human experience-tells us that man is so d
honest or so weak as to be influenced to the point of '
tive prejudice by any casual acquaintance or any rem<
business interest.

We who are so sensitive-we who scream in mor
anquish at the mere mention of the word "insuranc1
for example-do great injustice to the system. The tn
is, people are basically decent and honest. When a pre
lem is put to them they make an honest, sincere effort
reach a fair solution. They do this without regard
inconsequenhal considerations and local influences.

A person's right to a trial in his own community
important to him. It is important enough to warrant
constitutional guaranty (Utah Constitution, Article XL
Sec. 1). A court should give fair consideration to fac
showing proper reason for a change of venue. But loc
venue should not be lightly regarded. ·There are so mai
reasons for a local determination of controversies. He
wrong it would be to say to a people of a community th
any case brought against any one of you by a non-reE
dent must be tried outside your community, at addition
expense and at inoonvenience to you, because you
6

raise cattle here and you all have some acquaintance with
each other. In a case like ours, the condition of the fence
is very important fo the fad trier. You can show a jury
photographs of a fence in a distance county, or you can,
under proper direction, take a jury out and show it the
fence. \iVhich is the better evidence~ Pictures can be
tlistorted and can be so misleading. The most reliable
evidence is the actual view, and this requires a local
trial. Our search always is for the truth, and 1absent
facts showing actual bias, truth can best be arrived at
through local trial. This is why our jury system works
quite well.
In any event, the question in our case comes down
to this, 'as it does in all these cases involving this question: Does the record in this case reflect any basic unfairn~ss ! We ref er to the examination of the jury panel
by the trial Judge, as shown in the transcript, pages 2
to 29, inclusive. We submit this record discloses:
0

1. A careful conduct of the voir dire by the trial
Judge, with a sincere effort toward fairness. and certainly no discretionary abuse; and
2. A jury panel, after dismissals for cause by the
0ourt, that evidenced a desire and an ability to perform
the jury function.
All cases on this subject say about the same thing:
the trial Judge is to be supported unless his ruling shows
an abuse of his discretion of such a nature as to prevent
a fair trial for the complaining party.
1

The opinion in Chamblee v. Stocks, 9 Utah 2d 342,
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334 Pac. 2d 980, expresses this doctrine of fairness as
well as any case, and factually it is as close to our case
as any we find. rrhis case factually is superior from the
plaintiff's standpoint to our present case, since at least
there is in the Chamblee case a factual basis given by
a;ffidavit for the Court to act. We rest our argument,
without formal conclusion, upon this decision and on the
voir dire of the jury, pages 2 through 29 of the transcript. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent portion of the opinion in Chambless v. Stocks, as follows:
"The motion for change of venue was filed
and argued long before trial and was based on
an affidavit which, in the words of plaintiff's
brief, 'set forth* * * the fact that the defendant,
J·ohn Stocks, was an elected official * * "", that
he was a member of one of the oldest families
in Moab and Grand County, and had many
friends in the community, and that because of
his official position, relatives and friends * • •
it would be impossible to have an impartial
trial.' (Emphasis added.)
"Change of venue generally is discretionary
and absent a clear abuse thereof a trial court's
order denying or granting it will not be disturbed. With nothing more than facts reflected in
the language quoted above, a trial court would
not abuse its discretion, in our opinion, by denying the change. The wisdom of the Court's
denial here quite clearly was established when
the jurors were questioned for cause shortly
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before they were sworn. At that time, although
all knew or knew of the sheriff, and some were
1acquainted with him, none evinced any disposition to try the case other than fairly, on the
evidence, and under instructions of the trial
court, - except possibly two prospective jurors,
- one of whom, although admitting embarrassment to act as venireman, acknowledged an
ability to transcend it, - he being eliminated
by the plaintiff's peremptory challenge, and
the other for cause on motion of defendant. It
would not be consonant with our traditional
judicial procedure or complimentary to our
jury system to deny a man trial by jury of his
neighbors because he happened to be an official,
and had friends and relatives in the community.
* * * "
Respectfully submitted,
Daniel A. Alsup
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent
1101 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
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